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Abstrak. Aspek Hukum Produk Perbankan Syariah “Berkebun Emas”. Perbankan syariah dapat berkembang 
dengan cepat melalui inovasi produk berbasis pasar. Inovasi produk ini harus sesuai dengan aturan yang ditetapkan 
dalam hukum Islam. Konsep kontrak dalam Islam harus memperhatikan tiga aspek, yaitu: hukum substansi kontrak, 
hukum sesuatu yang berkaitan dengan substansi kontrak, dan kejelasan kontrak. Sebuah kontrak menjadi tidak valid 
jika terjadi ta’alluq (ketergantungan antara 2 kontrak atau lebih) dan shafqatayn fî al-shafqah (ketidakpastian yang 
timbul dari kontrak ganda). Artikel ini menjelaskan bahwa produk ‘berkebun emas’ yang ditawarkan oleh bank syariah 
melanggar prinsip-prinsip kontrak dalam Islam. Produk ini harus dimodifikasi lebih lanjut agar sesuai dengan aturan 
kontrak dalam Islam. 
Kata kunci: hukum Islam, hukum ekonomi syariah, hukum perbankan syariah
Abstract. Legal Aspects of  ‘Gold Farming’ Islamic Banking Product. Islamic banking can progress quickly through 
market-based product innovation. This product innovation must be in accordance with the rules laid down in Islamic 
law. The concept of contract in Islam should pay attention to three aspects, namely: the substance of contract law, 
the law that is related to the substance of the contract, and contract clarity. A contract becomes invalid if ta’alluq 
(dependence between two or more contracts) and shafqatayn fî al-shafqah (uncertainty arising from multiple contracts) 
occurs. This article explains that the ‘gold farming’ products offered by Islamic bank violate of the principles of contract 
in Islam. This product should be the modified further to accord with the rules of Islamic contract.
Keywords: Islamic law, Islamic economics law, Islamic banking law
Introduction
To develop rapidly, Islamic banks need to create 
appealing, competitive, and profitable product in-
novations with the goal of making Islamic transactions 
easier. These products should be market-oriented to 
attract customers from conventional banks and to 
compete in the national banking market. Product 
innovation is not merely copying conventional or foreign 
banking products, but is the attempt to dig and develop 
creatively contemporary fiqh al-mu’âmalah (Islamic 
business jurisprudence) concepts using the tools of ushûl 
al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), qawâ’id fiqhiyyah 
(methods of jurisprudence), târîkh tasyrî’ (early Islamic 
legal formation), and its falsafah (philosophy), as well as 
maqâshid al-syarî’ah (objectives of Islamic law). Ijtihâd 
insyâ’î (unprecendented legal opinion) and ijtihâd intiqâ’î 
(previous legal opinions selection) methods are key to 
these product innovations.1 However, current demand-
Recived: 18th January 2014, revised: 7th March 2014, accepted: 
25th May 2014.
1 Agustianto and Azhari Akmal Tarigan, Inovasi Produk Perbankan 
Syariah dan Aspek Pengembangan Fiqh Muamalah, this article is
driven profit-oriented product innovation seems to be 
problematic from the viewpoint from Islamic law. There 
are new products which needs a comprehensive review 
viewed from the concepts of fiqh al-mu’âmalah. ‘Gold 
farming’, for example, is one such product. 
Definition of ‘Gold Farming’
‘Gold farming’ is the name of a product offered 
by Padangsidempuan City Syariah Mandiri Bank. 
Similar products are offered at other banks, all 
intending to attract customers to invest in gold. Bank 
act as intermediary, buying, or selling gold on behalf 
of customers. Profit is obtained from the increase in 
future gold price. Details are as follows:2first, bank as 
buyer of gold. Bank main role is to act as intermediary 
between capital-rich and capital-poor customers in acts 
of investment. In the practice of gold farming, bank is 
the mediator or customers who wish to purchase gold. 
presented in Forum Riset Perbankan Syariah III in Medan on 2011, 
p. 421. 
2 This definition of ‘gold farming’ is obtained through interview 
with the Padangsidempuan Bank Syariah Madiri Branch Head on 26 
November 2011.
166 Ahkam: Vol. XIV, No. 2, Juli 2014
In practice, customers buy gold not to own it but to 
profit from its future higher price. Bank provides the 
necessary funding through qardh (benevolent loan) 
mechanism, paying 85 percent of gold total price, with 
the customers paying the remaining 15 percent. 
Second, bank as safekeeper of gold. Beside buying 
gold, bank also safekeep purchased gold in the expectation 
of gold price increase. Bank charge customers for this 
safekeeping through wadî’ah (deposit) mechanism. This 
charge, called ujrah (service charge) is paid for the bank’s 
duty of monitoring gold market price. As the purchase 
of gold by customers is to obtain profit due to gold price 
future increase, bank monitors this price continuously 
and inform customers when there is a change in gold 
price. Customers would then tell them if they wish to 
sell or maintain the gold.
Third, profit calculation for customer and Islamic 
bank.3 When purchasing gold, bank uses the following 
formula:
THE = JE x HE0
where:
THE  = Total gold price
JE  = Gold amount 
HE0  = Gold market price at the time of purchase
The formula of total gold price bank must pay:
HB = JE x HD x PB
where: 
HB = Bank purchase price 
JE  = Gold amount
HD = Base price set by bank
PB .. = Percentage of gold price paid by bank (85 
      percent)
The formula of total gold price paid by customer:
HN = JE x HN x PN 
where: 
HN = Customer purchase price
JE = Gold amount
HD = Base price set by bank 
PN = Percentage of gold price paid by customer (15 
percent)
Customer price due to gold price increase (floating 
value) is calculated as follows:
KE = (Hj x JE) – Hn – Uj - Adm
where:
KE = Customer profit
3 This conclusion is obtained from an interview on 20 November 
2011 with the Marketing Department of Padangsidempuan Bank 
Syariah Mandiri Marketing Department with certain modification by 
the author.
Hj   = Latest gold price 
Uj = Ujra or the safekeeping rate of gold by gram 
in two weeks (Rp. 3.000/gram and Rp. 6.000/
gram/month)
Adm = One time contract admiistration fee 
To illustrate, current gold price is Rp.510.000/
gram, amount of gold purchased 1000 gram, total gold 
price 510.000 x 1000 gram = 510.000.000. If base 
gold price in Islamic bank is assumed to be 485.000 
and the amount of gold purchased is 1.000 gram, the 
amount paid by Islamic bank is 485.000 x 1000 x 
0,85 = 412.250.000. The customer pay 510.000.000 – 
412.50.000 = 97.750.000. If gold price increased to Rp. 
520.000, total profit is 520.000.000 – 510.000.000 = 
10.000.000. Customer obtain a profit of 520.000.000 
– 412.250.000. = 107.750.000, with initial capital of 
9.750.000, which means a profit of 107.750.000 – 
9.750.000 = 10.000.000. Safekeeping fee per month 
is 6.000 x 1000 gram = 6.000.000, administration fee 
600.000. Hence total profit is 10.000.000 – 6.000.000 
- 600.000 = 3.400.000.
The Concept of ‘Aqd in Islamic Economics
‘Aqd in Arabic means promise, association, or 
agreement.4 ‘Aqd binds two parties within the boundary 
of Islamic law and cause rights and obligations to 
arise between them. A more detailed definition is 
an agreement or commitment in verbal, gesture, or 
written forms between two or more parties causing 
binding legal implications.5 A similar meaning is the 
occurence of îjâb (offer) and qabûl (acceptance) within 
the bounds of Islamic law effecting a legal influence on 
contract object.6 Hence, it can be concluded that ‘aqd is 
an agreement between two or more parties which cause 
legal rights and obligations to arise between them. ‘Aqd 
in Islamic economics can be differentiated into two, 
there are tabarru’ (donation) and tijârah (trade). 
 ‘Aqd tabarru’ (donation contract) is non profit in 
nature. Tabarru’ assumes mutual help not commercial 
profit in business transaction. In this case, there is to be 
no fee, only God will provide compensation. However, 
the one aiding could request transaction fee paid by 
the one aided.7In this situation, there are three general 
4 Direktorat Perbankan Syariah, Kamus Istilah Keuangan dan 
Perbankan Syariah,  (Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2006),  p. 62.
5 Muhammad Salâm Madkûr, Al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al–Islâmî, 
(T.t.p.: Dâr al-Nahdhah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1963), p. 506.
6 Mohammad Hidayat, An Introduction to The Sharia Economic 
(Pengantar Ekonomi Syariah), (Jakarta: Zikrul Hakim, 2010), p. 322.
7 Adiwarman K. Karim, Bank Islam Analisis Fiqh dan Keuangan, 
(Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2011), p. 68.
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forms of tabarru’:8 (1) Money lending. Money lending 
without any condition aside from the return of the loan 
after a certain amount of time is called qardh. Money 
lending with security is called rahn (pawning). Loan 
take-over is called hiwâlah (debt-transfer). (2) Service 
provision. Any provision of expertise of skill for others 
is called wakâlah (power of attorney). Safekeeping 
services is called wadî’ah. Another variation of wakâlah 
is contingent wakâlah, when someone willing to do 
something on another’s behalf if the condition is fulfilled, 
or if something else happens. (3) Gift giving. Included 
in this type is hibah (grant), waqf (benefaction), and 
shadaqah (alms).
Trade (tijârah) is for profit in nature, such as 
investment, buy and sell, or rent. In terms of result 
uncertainty, tijârah is divided into two, natural 
certainty contract and natural uncertainty contract. 
Natural certainty contract divided in two: (1) Buy and 
sell contract. A popular contract in current Islamic 
banking is mark-up buy and sell or cost-plus sale, such 
as murâbahah (deferred payment sale), salam (forward 
sale), and istishnâ’ (commission to manufacture). 
Murâbahah (also called bay’ mu’ajjal) refers to sale 
where the seller sells back to the buyer at a previously 
agreed higher price, with payment determined at a 
certain time, in cash or credit. The seller assumes risk 
of goods traded until they are handed over to the buyer. 
Salam is upfront payment of goods with predetermined 
time of goods exchange. Istishnâ’ is seller (contractor) 
agrees to create (build) and hand over (construct) 
with predetermined price and date in the future. Like 
salam and istishnâ’ is an exception of an Islamic general 
rule which forbids anyone from selling things they do 
not own. But, unlike salam the payment need not be 
upfront. Payment could be paid in installments to suit 
the wishes of parties involved in transaction, or part 
upfront and the rest upon agreement.9(2) Rent contract. 
Ijârah (leasing) could be used to finance vehicles such 
as cars, ships, and planes. Ijarah rends with transfer of 
ownership upon payment of the rest of the purchase 
through cash or credit (hire-purchase).
Natural uncertainty contract devide in: (1) Musyâra-
kah (partnership). Musyârakah is an agreement between 
two or more parties. The parties contribute financially 
or physically, although the contribution need not be 
equal. Musyârakah contract is similar to classical joint-
venture mechanism. Both parties provide contribution 
 8 Adiwarman K. Karim, Bank Islam Analisis Fiqh dan Keuangan, p. 
68.
9 Zamir Iqbal dan M. Umer Chapra, Pengharaman Bunga Bank; 
Rasionalkah?, (Jakarta: SEBI, 2002), p. 1-18.
(such as asset, technical and managerial expertise, and 
money) and share result according to their agreement. 
(2) Muzâra’ah (crop-sharing). Muzâra’ah is crop sharing 
applied to a year of farming. According to Antonio, 
muzâra’ah is cooperation between land manager, land 
owner, and land laborer, where land owner hands the 
land to land laborer to be tended to. At the end of the 
year, the laborer would get a share of the harvest. In 
the context of Islamic financial institution, muzâra’ah 
financial assistance can be provided for customers 
owning plantation or agriculture businesses.10(3) 
Musâqâh (modified crop-sharing). Musâqâh is another 
simpler form of muzâra’ah where land laborer is only 
responsible for watering and maintaining the land. The 
return to the laborer is a share of harvest.11
       
Prohibition in Mu’âmalah Contract
 In mu’âmalah, a famous maxim is ‘everything 
is allowed except when prohibitive text exist,’ which 
means that all economic activities are permissible unless 
explicitly prohibited by Islamic law. In addition, Islam 
provides clear description of forbidden transaction: (1) 
Unlawful substance. In this case, transaction is forbidden 
due to the unlawfulness of the substance explicitly 
explicitly mentioned in Qur’an and Hadis, such as 
trade of alcohol and pork. (2) Unlawfulness other than 
the substance. The reasons for unlawfulness other than 
the substance: first, tadlîs (deception). Every transaction 
in Islam is based on voluntary willingness of parties 
involved. They must possess the same information, such 
that no deception occur in these 4 aspects: quantity, 
10 Syafi’i Antonio, Bank Syariah Teori dan Praktek, (Jakarta: Gema 
Insani Press, 2001), p. 9.
11 Syafi’i Antonio, Bank Syariah Teori dan Praktek, p. 9.
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quality, price, and delivery time.12 Tadlîs in essence is 
deception caused mainly by asymmetric information, 
where one or more party lack the information known 
to the other parties.
 Second, taghrîr (uncertainty). Ibn Taymiyyah 
stated that gharar means al-majhûl al-‘âqibatuh13(cause 
unknown). Taghrîr (gharar) occurs when there is 
incomplete information due to uncertainty from both 
parties involved in the transaction. Gharar occurs when 
something certain changes to something uncertain. 
Taghrîr is a condition where parties involved in the 
transaction are uncertain about their rights and 
obligations. Taghrîr comes from the Arabic root word 
gharar, which means effect, risk, and uncertainty. In 
fiqh al-mu’âmalah, taghrîr means performing actions 
blindly without adequate knowledge, or performing 
actions blindly without understanding the risk involved. 
According to Ibn Taimiyyah, gharar occurs when an 
involved party do not know in advance the end result of 
trade performed. Like tadlîs, taghrîr or gharar occurs due 
to incomplete information. The difference is in tadlîs 
only one party suffers incomplete information), whereas 
in taghrîr, all parties suffer incomplete information.
 Third, ribâ. Fiqh text states that any addition to 
initial capital is ribâ. Muslims are forbidden to take ribâ 
in all its form. This prohibition is found both in Qur’an 
and Hadis. In chapter Âli ‘Imrân [3]: 130 mentioned, 
“O you faithful, do not consume ribâ multiply and 
obey God for your own fortune”. In chapter al-Baqarah 
[2]: 278-279 mentioned: 
 ھ   ھ   ھ   ھ    ہ   ہ   ہ   ہ   ۀ
 ۇ    ڭ   ڭ   ڭ   ڭ   ۓ  ۓ    ے   ے
 ۅ   ۋ   ۋ   ۇٴ   ۈۈ   ۆ   ۆ   ۇ
 ې  ې  ې  ۉ   ۉ  ۅ
Fourth, bay’ najasy. Bay’ najasy or engineering 
market demand occurs when a producer generate 
false demand increase price of a product. Several hadis 
contains prohibition of najasy such as the one narrated 
by ’Umar R.a., that The Prophet has forbidden najasy”. 
In addition, Ibn Aû Awf narrated that najasy fabricators 
commit ribâ and treason, najasy is deceptive and 
unlawful and fabricators rot in hell.
 Fifth, ihtikâr (hoarding). Many translates ihtikâr as 
monopoly or hoarding, two very different concepts. In 
12  Wiroso, Jual Beli Murabahah, (Jakarta: Universitas Islam 
Indonesia, 2005), p. 16.
13 Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Fatawâ al-Kubrâ, (Beirut: Dâr al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyyah, 1987), Vol. V, p. 16.
Islam, natural monopoly is allowed, that is monopoly by 
a party who is the sole producer of a particular product. 
Also, not all hoarding are forbidden, for example, 
government-sanctioned hoarding to maintain price 
and supply stability. What forbidden is engineering 
supply to obtain above-normal profit, otherwise known 
as ihtikâr. In a hadis Imâm Ahmad and al-Thabranî as 
recorded by Ma’qal ibn Yasâr it is said that “Whosoever 
meddles with demand to increase commodity price will 
be set on bones of hellfire by God”. Ihtikâr is performed 
by reducing supply and as such, according to economic 
law, its price will increase. Thus, ihtikâr is also known 
as supply/offer engineering. In economic theory, this is 
known as monopoly’s rent.
Invalid Contract
A transaction not in li dzâtih (prohibited because 
of the thing itself ) and li ghayrih (prohibited because 
of others factors) unlawful category does not make it 
lawful. A contract deemed incomplete or invalid can 
nullify a transaction, making it unlawful. A transaction 
is incomplete/invalid when the following elements exist: 
first, unfulfilled principles and requirements. A contract 
is deemed valid when principles and requirements are 
fulfilled. Principles are things that must be present in 
a transaction such as the existence of buyer and seller. 
Without buyer and seller there is no trade. In general 
there are 3 economics mu’âmalah principles:14(1) Actors 
could be buyer and seller (in buy and sell contract), 
lessor-lessee (in rent contract), or employer-employee 
(in work contract) and others. Without actors there 
are no transaction. (2) Transaction objects of the above 
contracts could be goods or services. For example,  in 
car and house transaction, the objects of transaction are 
car and house respectively. Without transaction object, 
a contract is impossible. (3) Consent. Consent is vital 
in a contract. In fiqh terminology, consent is known 
as mutual agreement. All parties agree independently 
to come to an agreement. However, a contract could 
be voided if there are false objects, coercion, and 
deception. 
Second, ta’alluq. Ta’alluq occurs when there are inter-
related contracts, such as when the validity of contract A 
depends on contract B. For example, when A sells good 
X valued at Rp 120 million in credit to B, requiring 
B to sell the good X back to A cash for about Rp 100 
million. The above transaction is unlawful, as there is a 
requirement of A selling good X to B on the condition 
that B sells the good back to A. In this case, the first 
14 Adiwarman K. Karim, Bank Islam Analisis Fiqh dan Keuangan, 
p. 68.
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contract is deemed valid when the second contract is 
agreed. The application of this requirement violates 
Islamic principles. In fiqh terminology, the above case is 
called bay’ al-‘înah (sale and buy-back agreement).
Third, ”two-in-one”. Two-in-one is a condition 
where a transaction is based on two contracts, such as 
there is uncertainty (gharar) to which contract is used. 
In fiqh, this condition is called shafqatayn fî al-shafqah. 
Abû Hurayrah and ’Amr ibn Syu’ayb reported that 
the Prophet had forbidden two separate transactions 
combined in an offer. The Prophet said that ”A loan 
based on a trade transaction requirement is forbidden, 
nor can a loan be beased on two related requirements 
in a transaction…” (H.r. Tirmidzî, Abû Dâwud and al-
Nasâ’î).
Hybrid Contract
Hybrid contract or al-’uqud al-murakkabah (contract 
combination design) is necessary to accomodate 
current financial transactions as single contract would 
be unable to fulfill contemporary financial transaction.15 
Eventhough Islamic law forbids two contracts in a 
transaction, this prohibition is not general and only 
specific for three problems: bay’ and salaf prohibition, 
bay’atayn fî bay’atayn and shafqatayn fî shafqatayn 
prohibition. The first forbidden case is the combination 
of qardh and trade. This is based on the Hadis “Abû 
Hurayrah said that the Prophet forbids the combination 
of qardh and trade”. (H.r. Ahmad).16 The second case, 
bay’ al-’înah. The third case is the offer of two prices by 
one seller to one buyer. For example, good price is X, 
when paid cash Rp. 10 million, and when paid credit 
Rp. 12 million. The buyer accept (voice out qabûl) 
without first choosing the price. This kind of trade is 
forbidden due to price uncertainty (gharar).
Provision of zhawâbith (hybrid) contract are: first, 
15 Agustianto and Azhari Akmal Tarigan, Inovasi Produk Perbankan 
Syariah dan Aspek Pengembangan Fiqh Muamalah, p. 438-440. 
16 Imâm Abû ‘Abd Allâh Ahmad ibn Hanab, Musnad Ahmad, 
(Beirut: Dâr al-Ihyâ al-Turâts al-‘Arabî, 1414 H), Vol. II, p. 178 and 
Agustianto and Azhari Akmal Tarigan, Inovasi Produk Perbankan 
Syariah dan Aspek Pengembangan Fiqh Muamalah, p. 438-440.
forbidden due to religious text. The prohibition of 
combination of two trade contracts into one. This 
prohibition is due to a Hadis narrated by Mâlik that 
Abû Hurayrah said that The Prophet forbid two trades 
combined into one and from a Hadis narrated by 
Ahmad from Abû Hurayrah that The Prophet forbid 
trade and benevolent loan executed together.
Second, forbidded due to hîlah to ribâ. Trade in this 
category is al-înah, forbidden due to its hîlah to ribâ.
Third, multi-contract causing ribâ. Every multi-
contract causing unlawfulness, such as ribâ, is unlawful, 
even if the underlying contracts are allowed, such as 
combining qardh with gift promise. The combination 
of several contracts initially allowed but later was found 
to trigger forbidden actions will be deemed unlawful. 
An example is a salaf and trade multi-contract. A 
combination of qardh and gift/other benefit forbidden 
by Islam. Ulama agree to forbid qardh combined with 
a promise of more return, such as gift. For example, 
Ahmad lent money to Andi, requiring Andi to rent his 
house to Ahmad. This is forbidden.
Fourth, multi contract which causes gharar to arise. 
For example, a multifinance company sells a car to 
customer at a certain price such as Rp. 250 million paid 
in credit for 24 months with no initial downpayment. 
However, the company offers several downpayment 
alternatives. If the downpayment is paid in the sixth 
month, the total car price will be cheaper, then if it is 
paid in the thirteenth month, and so on. Hence there is 
no certainty in the total car price, which causes gharar 
to arise.
Problem Analysis
The practice of ’gold farming’ raises several questions, 
there are: (1) Transaction speculative in nature such as 
depending on the increase or decrease of gold price 
allowed. (2) Can third-party fund from qardh be used 
for business purposes, as qardh is usually intended for 
the poor with no fee for their loan. Qardh usually comes 
from customer zakât (compulsory alms), infâq (giving), 
and shadaqah (alms) they paid as a requirement of 
worship, such as hajj (pilgrimage) fund. (3) Related to 
the excessive safekeeping fee when gold price decrease 
but customer must still pay a fee of 3000/gram per two 
weeks and  6000/gram every month. In this case, bank 
is never at a loss while customers do so. The principle of 
profit-and-loss sharing is violated.
Legal Aspect of ‘Gold Farming’
Based on the above principles, the practice of ’gold 
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farming’ at Islamic banks can be concluded as follows: 
first, qard fund is used for business purposes. It is found 
through discussion that the fund used to purchase 
customer gold was taken from qardh fund. A fatwâ 
by Islamic Law National Board (DSN-Dewan Syariah 
Nasional MUI) Number 19/DSN-MUI/IV/2001 on al-
qardh stated that al-qardh fund could come from LKS 
capital share, leftover LKS profit, and fund from other 
institution or individual who trust their infâq funds to 
LKS. One of the sources of qardh fund (point c) is infâq. 
So, it should be distributed to tabarru’ business. This is 
supported by Ibn al-Qayyim who stated that the Prophet 
prohibit multi-contract between salaf (loan/qardh) and 
trade to avoid being involved in ribâ. However, if the 
two contracts are separated (independent, mu’allaq) it is 
permissible. This opinion emphasise that qardh cannot 
be connected to any other contract as qardh tabarru’ not 
business in nature.
 Second, ta’alluq between musyârakah and wadî’ah 
contract. In ’gold farming’ practice, customer and 
Islamic bank are involved in partnership to provide 
funding to buy gold. The capital proportion is 15 
percent from customer and 85 persen from Islamic 
bank. Customer obtain profit according to gold price 
increase, while according to Islamic law it should be 
obtained proportional to the share between bank and 
custimer.
On one hand, Islamic bank does not profit from 
gold selling price but on the other hand it require 
customers to pay a fee to safekeep the gold (ujrah) 
through wadî’ah contract while customer wait for the 
gold price to increase. The ujrah fee here depends on 
the selling period. If in two weeks the ujrah fee amounts 
to 3000/gram and between two weeks to a month the 
ujrah fee is 6.000,- /gram every month. Beyond one 
month the fee is multiplied by 6000/gram every month 
till the gold is sold.
In the case of ta’alluq in a contract indirectly 
the Islamic bank require gold to be safekept with it. 
Through the safekeeping the Islamic bank obtain profit 
from the fixed fee paid by customers for the time the 
gold safekept with the bank. In this case, there is a hîlah 
(pretext) towards gharar.
Third, zhulm (injustice) element in the case of profit 
and loss sharing. In the profit taking of gold selling price 
there exist an element of zhulm to customer. The gold 
price paid by Islamic bank is 85 percent of price fixed 
by Islamic bank, while the customer pay 15 percent. 
The price fixed by Islamic bank is usually under market 
price. This means that the Islamic bank has obtained a 
profit from the beginning, while the customer has not 
obtained any profit.
Furthermore, if the gold price decrease the customer 
will suffer a loss. The Islamic bank does not suffer any 
loss and even obtain profit from administrative and 
safekeeping fee (ujrah). In this case, there no loss sharing 
as the bank is guaranteed a profit. According to Islamic 
law, profit and loss should be borne by both customer 
and Islamic bank.
The principle of musyârakah is business sharing 
profit and loss. When the price of gold increase, the 
profit seemed to be given only to the customer with the 
Islamic bank obtaining no profit.  However, the bank 
do profit from the fixed wadî’ah based ujrah fee. This 
fixed fee will reduce customer profit sometimes even 
to a degree of loss, while the bank remain profitable 
through the ujrah fee. Ideally, the ujrah fee should be in 
line with the profit obtained from the result of gold sale. 
This means, the higher the profit the higher the ujrah 
fee obtained and vice-versa. The principle of profit and 
loss sharing is violated as the bank stay in profit while 
the customer make a loss when gold price decrease.
Fourth, speculative or gharar element. There exist a 
speculative element in the future sale of gold. The price 
of gold may not increase in a sudden, while if the price 
decrease the customer will definitely suffer a loss. In this 
case, both Islamic bank and the customer are involved 
in taghrîr, which is acting blindly without adequate 
knowledge, or taking risk or performing risky action 
without knowing its exact outcome or consequence. As 
Ibn Taymiyyah stated, gharar occurs when there is no 
knowledge of outcome in the end of a trade or business 
or trade activity.
The idea of justice in Islamic economics consider 
any uncertainty in quantity, quality, cancellation 
ability, or goods status in a contract as gharar.17 The 
rationally calculated game of chance in finance is often 
called speculation. Speculation  even when calculated 
rationally will always contain uncertainty.
Fifth, hindering the growth of the real sector. ’Gold 
farming’ encourages speculative transactions. These 
transactions are often done through the Internet. 
The high gold demand in these transactions does 
not contribute positively to the real sector. Instead 
it encourages gold accumulation which burden the 
economy.18 Gold is merely an investment to maintain 
value so our hard-earned income would not be devalued 
17 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, Pengantar Keuangan Islam, 
Teori dan Praktek. (Jakarta: Prenada Media Group, 2008), p. 88.
18 Saparuddin Siregar, Mengembalikan Rahan Emas Sebagai Produk 
Tabarru’,  this article is presented in Forum Riset Perbankan Syariah III 
in Medan on 2011, p. 488.
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by inflation. An ideal investment is cash investment in 
the real which could provide greater return than ‘gold 
farming.’ The accumulation resulting from gold farming 
reduces cash available to invest in productive sector and 
many assets of an economy will remain idle.
Closing Remarks
In the case of ta’alluq in a contract indirectly the 
Islamic bank require gold safekeeping with it. The 
safekeeping enables the Islamic bank to obtain profit 
through a fixed safekeeping fee.
Ideally, the musyârakah principle requires profit and 
loss sharing. However, the in case of gold price increase 
profit is given to customer and Islamic bank seems to 
obtain no profit. However, the bank does profit through 
the fixed wadî’ah based ujrah fee. This fee may reduce 
the customer profit and sometimes put customer at a 
loss. The profit and loss sharing is ignored. Bank profits 
no matter what while customer suffer a loss when gold 
price decrease.
Speculation occurs in the wait of gold price increase, 
which is uncertain anyway. If the gold price decrease, the 
customer would suffer a loss, while the bank does not. 
Both Islamic bank and customer are involved in taghrîr, 
which is acting blindly without adequate knowledge, or 
taking risk or performing risky action without knowing 
its exact outcome or consequence. []
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